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Research in science education has long been concerned with a problem that 
students acquire conceptions which are unsatisfactory from the scientific 
point of view. These conceptions are also often robust and slow to change. 
The learning process whereby the students’ conceptions undergo a change is 
often viewed from the point of view of conceptual change. In this thesis, this 
traditional problem of conceptual change is approached as a problem of 
concept learning, where concepts are complex structures and parts of a 
conceptual system. The approach is thus termed here the systemic view. It is 
influenced by recent cognitive science research on relational concepts, which 
are concepts characterized by their relational structure and/or the relations 
they bear to other concepts. Because scientific models can also be 
conceptualized as relational structures, relational structures are central from 
the viewpoint of scientific knowledge. The systemic view thus bridges the 
cognitive aspects of learning (students’ initial knowledge) and the target 
knowledge, thereby illuminating the learning process that leads from initial 
conceptions to advanced scientific knowledge.  The articles presented in this 
thesis consist of two empirical studies (I and II), in which students’ 
conceptions about DC circuits are examined from the systemic view 
perspective. These studies develop and apply the directed graph model, 
which is a graphical representation of the different conceptual elements. It 
allows examining students’ conceptions and their change in detail. Such 
graphs also act as templates for computational modelling of the learning 
process reported in two other articles (IV and V). The computational models 
allow examining structural aspects of concepts and their context-dependent 
dynamics. Article III examines the role of models and modelling in concept 
learning and suggests how seeing models as relational categories clarifies the 
cognitive aspects related to model-based learning. The results of the thesis 
show that in learning advanced scientific knowledge, students’ ability to 
modify and revise relational knowledge is vital to the learning and 
acquisition of correct conceptions. A result of practical significance is the 
strong context and task dependence of these processes of modifications and 
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One longstanding problem in science education is that during learning, 
students develop an idiosyncratic and only partially correct understanding of 
scientific phenomena and how to conceptualize them. In explaining scientific 
phenomena, students often use concepts and models that have only a 
tangential resemblance to accepted scientific knowledge—sometimes even 
contradicting it. Students’ own personal knowledge and concepts that differ 
from scientific knowledge and concepts are difficult to change even after 
ample instruction or when students are faced with counterevidence. The 
problem lies in how students’ own intuitive understandings and concepts 
guide and restrict their further learning. Sometimes students’ initial 
conceptions are mixed with the to-be-learned scientific concepts, forming 
unscientific synthetic conceptions (Vosniadou, 1994).  
The nature of students’ prior knowledge and its role in learning has been a 
major focus in science education and in its more disciplinary focused 
research domains (e.g. physics education research). Such research pays close 
attention to the nature of target knowledge, because it affects the learning 
processes and the ways in which teaching is designed. In physics, the target 
concepts and models are often abstract and complex. Grasping their meaning 
and learning to apply them requires that students acquire complex relational 
schemes and gradually form interlinked, heterogeneous knowledge elements 
of complex knowledge.  
The students learning process where personal knowledge is transformed 
into scientific knowledge has often been examined from the point of view of 
conceptual change (Amin, Smith, & Wiser, 2014). The term conceptual 
change refers to the process of restructuring one’s conceptual structure. In 
this thesis, the focus is on the part of conceptual change that involves the 
transformation and acquisition of concepts. In what follows, these processes 
are referred to briefly as concept learning. Concepts are here understood as 
learners’ internal, mental representations in contrast to scientific concepts, 
which are collectively accepted and shared external representations 
(Rusanen & Pöyhönen, 2013). In traditional accounts, the conceptual change 
process is seen as a special kind of learning process in which students’ 
ontological commitments, epistemological beliefs or standards of explanation 
undergo a change. Previous research has assumed that students have 
somewhat stable, recognizable initial knowledge states, which are 
transformed into other, stable, and hopefully more scientific knowledge 
states (Clement, 2008). These kinds of views on learning, however, have 
been criticized and challenged, and many alternatives have been proposed 
(see e.g. Hammer & Brown, 2008; Ohlsson, 2009) although coherent 




This work focuses on a cognitively oriented approach to concept learning 
and specifically on the acquisition of scientific concepts in the context of 
physics. While many recent studies on concept learning and conceptual 
change have paid attention to social, cultural and affective factors, we still 
lack an adequate cognitive account of the process of learning of scientific 
concepts (Clement, 2013). Also, a persistent issue within conceptual change 
research is that there are diverging views about what kind of entities 
concepts themselves are (Rusanen & Pöyhönen, 2013; diSessa & Sherin, 
1998). For instance, certain views argue that concepts are embedded in 
intuitive “framework theories” consisting of implicit epistemological and 
ontological beliefs (Vosniadou, 1994; Vosniadou & Skopeliti, 2014). These 
views, while receiving some support from research, put less emphasis on the 
structure and the relational schemes related to individual concepts, which 
are arguably central in grasping scientific concepts at high school and 
university levels (Koponen & Huttunen, 2013). Other approaches emphasize 
students’ ontological categorizations as the key factor in learning and lean on 
a view of concepts where concepts are collections of features and where 
learning constitutes acquiring these features (Chi, 2008; 2013).  
Science education research, when it is subject-matter oriented, has 
focused on model-based learning (MBL) approaches, which assume that 
models are central in concept learning. Although concept learning is one of 
the main goals of MBL, relatively few studies have tried to develop a 
cognitively justified view of MBL and how it facilitates concept learning 
(Louca & Zacharia, 2012; for notable exceptions, see Nersessian, 1995; 
Clement, 2008).  
Recent developments in cognitive science have paid attention to the role 
of relational knowledge in cognition (Goldwater & Gentner, 2015; Halford, 
Wilson, & Phillips, 2010). Researchers have shown that our understanding of 
many concepts hinges on the relation that concepts bear to other concepts, 
and it is assumed that such relational knowledge also forms the foundation 
for many of our higher cognitive competences (Goldwater & Schalk, 2016). 
As relational structures are also fundamental to the target knowledge (i.e. 
scientific knowledge), a concept-learning approach based on relational 
knowledge thus forms an obvious interdisciplinary link between cognitive 
science research and science education. Such an approach can bridge the 
cognitive aspects of concept learning and its dynamics with central aspects of 
the target knowledge.  
In this thesis, students’ conceptions and concept learning are analysed by 
applying the systemic view developed herein. The systemic view on concept 
learning sees concepts predominantly as relational structures and knowledge 
as interconnected system of these structures. Also, according to this view, the 
nature of students’ knowledge, cognitive aspects of learning as well as the 
nature of the to-be-learned knowledge (i.e. scientific concepts and models) 
are all equally important in learning scientific concepts. One part of this 
study is also to explicate the conception of concepts based on recent 
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developments in cognitive science and to bridge this view with views about 
the nature of scientific knowledge.  
The specific context of the study is the learning of concepts related to 
direct current circuits. This context is well known from many previous 
studies about concept learning and allows the view developed here to be 
tested and evaluated. It enables us to see how the systemic view of concept 
learning and, more generally, the relational concepts approach may advance 
our understanding of concept learning in science.  
The main results are presented in five articles. Articles I and II report the 
empirical studies and the theoretical background ideas of the interpretations 
of empirical results. They also show the systemic view is contextualized in the 
case of learning DC circuit concepts. The theoretical underpinnings based on 
relational knowledge and how they are related to MBL are discussed in more 
detail in article III. Articles IV and V discuss how a systemic view yields 
computational modelling of concept learning.  
The systemic view on concept learning is based on the assumption that 
relational aspects of concepts are the key features in learning advanced 
scientific concepts. In this thesis, this view was originally developed without 
direct reference to relational concepts framework and psychological or 
cognitive theories of concepts (see articles I, and IV and V). Instead, the 
central role of relational structures was based directly on notions of the 
structure of the target knowledge (i.e. scientific knowledge). The relational 
concepts framework and research on relational representations, however, 
provide a cognitive basis and interpretation for the approach taken here. This 
connection is explicitly discussed in article III, which also provides the 
connection points between model-based learning and relational knowledge.   
Concept learning 
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2 CONCEPT LEARNING 
2.1 CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND CONCEPT LEARNING  
The learning of scientific concepts is often examined from the point of view 
of conceptual change. Conceptual change research evolved largely in the 
1970s along with growing interest in how students’ prior ideas might hinder 
learning and persist even after ample instruction (Amin et al., 2014; diSessa, 
2015). It was found that students need to overcome these prior conceptions—
a process often called conceptual change (Lappi, 2013). The term “conceptual 
change” is used broadly to denote the many kinds of transformation 
processes in learning, where student’s initial knowledge is transformed into 
scientific knowledge. In this thesis, however, instead of conceptual change, 
the term “concept learning” is preferred, because many learning processes 
involve only assimilation of new facts and/or concepts but no changes 
happen in concepts in the learner’s possession before the assimilation.  
Characterization of concept learning requires: a) a representation of 
students’ prior conceptions, b) a representation of the outcome, and c) 
specification of the learning mechanisms that lead from a to b (Lappi 2013). 
As learning is a psychological phenomenon, we need to lean on cognitive and 
psychological theories of concepts and learning in representing students’ 
representations and mechanisms of change. In other words, we need a 
description regarding what concepts or other knowledge elements are 
relevant to represent students’ knowledge (Koponen & Huttunen, 2013). To 
assess whether learning is successful or not, we need to compare how 
students’ use concepts (i.e. how they make inferences) and how concepts are 
used in science (Rusanen & Pöyhönen, 2013). Of course, in practice students’ 
inferences are compared to appropriately simplified or reconstructed 
scientific knowledge taught in high school or university. The 
interdependency between these three components are presented in Figure 1. 
How the separate articles I-V included in this thesis are situated within this 
framework is also shown in Figure 1.  
Regarding the target knowledge, model-based learning (MBL) addresses 
the issue of the nature of scientific knowledge. In MBL, models are adopted 
as the central elements of scientific knowledge and knowledge construction 
(Gilbert & Justi, 2016; Koponen, 2007; Nersessian, 1995). While the target 
knowledge and the underlying aims of learning provide the context and scope 
of the to-be-learned knowledge, psychology of learning describes the learning 
of such knowledge in terms of knowledge elements and mechanisms. In the 
context of MBL, such an approach is rare, as there are only a handful of 
studies that address the cognitive processes related to learning models and 
modelling (Louca & Zacharia, 2012). In article III, I discuss in detail how a 
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cognitively justified view of learning of scientific concepts, the views about 
scientific knowledge and students’ concepts can be bridged.  
There has been an extensive debate about the nature of students’ 
conceptions and the nature of the conceptual change process. Early studies 
examined concept learning at the level of single concepts and beliefs 
(diSessa, 2015). However, quite early on, research came to consider the 
underlying reasons for specific beliefs. Some have examined the conceptions 
in terms of ontologies while others described concept learning at the level of 
implicit theoretical beliefs (see e.g. Chi, 2013; Vosniadou, 1994).  
In addition to the different elements, it is often claimed that conceptual 
change comes in a variety of degrees or types. For example, learning might 
require simple accretion or refutation of facts, changes in the underlying 
epistemic and/or ontological suppositions or major re-organization of 
concepts or conceptual elements (Chi, 2013; Clement, 2008; Rusanen & 
Pöyhönen, 2013). Some authors distinguish the assimilation type of learning 
from conceptual change, which is then described as being in some sense a 
“special” or more fundamental type of learning or learning process (see e.g. 
Chi, 2013).  
In general, concepts, beliefs, and theories can be seen as examples of 
declarative knowledge, which is characterized as “knowing that” (Chi & 
Ohlsson, 2005). In contrast, procedural knowledge can be characterised as 
“knowing how”. Examples of this kind of knowledge include knowing how to 
ride a bike or how to solve a physics problem (Chi & Ohlsson, 2005). 
Procedural knowledge is distinct from declarative knowledge in that it is task 
dependent not necessarily verbalisable unlike conceptual knowledge, for 
example. These different types of knowledge are also associated with 
different learning processes and different instructional implications. For 
example, problem-solving practice enhances procedural knowledge and leads 
to more efficient problem-solving performance (Richey & Nokes-Malach, 
2015). In contrast, there is little evidence that practice would promote 
learning complex, coherence knowledge or help students to overcome 
misconceptions (Richey & Nokes-Malach, 2015).  
The different descriptions of conceptual elements and varieties of changes 
stem from different theoretical considerations and interpretations of 
empirical data facilitated by the theories. Much research has focused on 
conceptual change, but no apparent consensus has emerged even about the 
central issues surrounding the topic. A fundamental open question concerns 
the notion of concept itself. There is no commonly accepted account of what 
concepts are, what kinds of changes in students’ knowledge constitute 
conceptual change or about the mechanisms that bring it about (Clement, 
2013; diSessa & Sherin, 1998; Rusanen & Pöyhönen, 2013). Consequently, we 
still lack an adequate cognitive account of conceptual change and its 





While the different views have sometimes been conflicting, recent 
research has taken a more constructive viewpoint on concepts as a system 
consisting of multiple related features and conceptual change as a dynamic 
process where those features are transformed and changed in multiple ways 
(Amin et al., 2014; Brown & Hammer, 2008; Koponen & Huttunen, 2013). 
Many of the early “misconceptions” studies concentrated on students’ 
conceptions about specific topics within physics. This research examined and 
documented various “false beliefs” or “misconceptions” such as “the earth is 
closer to the sun in the summer” (Brown & Hammer, 2008; diSessa, 2015). 
While this perspective’s influence has waned during recent years, it continues 
to be widely held (Brown & Hammer, 2008; diSessa, 2015). Many of these 
studies have been conducted in the context of DC circuits. This is one of the 
main reasons why the context of DC circuits was chosen for the empirical 
studies. The purpose was not to identify new misconceptions. Instead, the 
familiar and well-known context provided a good platform for developing a 
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new kind of approach to concept learning. Next, the research on students’ DC 
circuit conceptions is discussed.  
Although a rather mundane topic for physics experts, DC circuits have 
been shown to be difficult to master even at the university level, let alone 
earlier. In many studies regarding students’ understanding of DC circuits and 
relevant concepts, students are asked to predict and explain the behaviour of 
simple circuits by ordering the bulbs according to their brightness.  
The problems students have are various, ranging from the lack of relevant 
concepts or models to the failure to comprehend the geometry of the circuit. 
The simplest explanations are mere rules of thumb, such as “the bulbs are 
equally bright because they are connected in series/parallel”. Apart from 
these merely descriptive statements, the most naïve intuitive explanations 
are based on the conception that something (electricity, current, energy, etc.) 
comes from a battery and is consumed by the bulbs (Borges & Gilbert, 1999; 
Koumaras, Kariotoglou, & Psillos, 1997; McDermott & Shaffer, 1992). 
Consequently, when a change is made in a circuit (a bulb is added or a switch 
is opened/closed), students may concentrate only on the part that has been 
changed and fail to consider that the change might affect other parts of the 
circuit as well (McDermott & Shaffer, 1992). Similarly, some students may 
think that the current in a circuit is not affected before it passes a component 
or that the current through a component is not affected by modifications to 
the circuit after the component (Picciarelli, di Gennaro, Stella, & Conte, 
1991).  
The above conceptions have been taken as students’ failure to consider 
the circuit as a system with interacting parts. That is, students are applying 
what is known as “local” or “sequential reasoning”. These conceptions are 
often accompanied by an idea that there is a decreasing amount of current 
going back to the battery. Also, in a simple series circuit, students often think 
that one bulb receives less than another, as the “first” bulb has already 
consumed a portion of the current. The conception that the battery acts as a 
source of constant current (i.e. the current does not depend on the 
components in the circuit) often occurs with this kind of thinking (Dupin & 
Johsua, 1987; McDermott & Shaffer, 1992). 
Students often do not distinguish between related terms and use the 
terms current, electricity, voltage and power interchangeably or so 
inconsistently that the terms’ meanings are ambiguous (Li & Singh, 2016; 
McDermott & Shaffer, 1992). Sometimes students explicitly understand 
voltage and electric current as synonymous or voltage is understood as the 
intensity or force of electric current or as the amount of current stored in a 
battery (McDermott & Shaffer, 1992; Reiner, Slotta, Chi, & Resnick, 2000). 
Some intuitive explanations concentrate on the number of elements in the 
circuit, such as “more bulbs—less current” or “less bulbs—more current” 
(McDermott & Shaffer, 1992). This of course fails to recognize the different 
connections and their respective resistances but nevertheless acknowledges 
the relation between the elements in the circuit and the current. More 
Concept learning 
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advanced explanations can exploit some quantitative formulas but fail to 
understand properly their meaning and how they are applied (Li & Singh, 
2016; McDermott & Shaffer, 1992). For example, students sometimes 
confuse individual and equivalent resistances and might substitute the 
equivalent resistance in the equation when calculating the power of single 
bulbs (Li & Singh, 2016). Also, while managing to calculate correctly the total 
current using equivalent resistance, students may then ignore the effect of 
individual resistances on the brightness of the bulbs. Students may also have 
a wrong interpretation of Ohm’s law in that they believe that whenever the 
electric current is zero it implies zero voltage as well (Li & Singh, 2016). 
While a typical task testing students’ knowledge involves predicting the 
relative brightness of bulbs connected in different circuits, students 
frequently fail to realize that the dissipated power determines the bulbs’ 
brightness—despite it being explicitly mentioned. Thinking that the electric 
current or the voltage determines the brightness is of course adequate in the 
case of identical bulbs but leads to wrong predictions in the case of non-
identical bulbs.  
In summary, the studies reviewed above focused on identifying the 
various problems and beliefs students have about basic DC circuits and the 
corresponding concepts. Typically, the focus in such studies is in revealing 
and characterizing students’ misconceptions–that is, conceptions that are 
wrong from the scientific point of view. 
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3 CONCEPT LEARNING AND THEORIES OF 
CONCEPTS 
3.1 CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES  
Research on students’ misconceptions has provided researchers and teachers 
alike with a characterization of the salient features of students’ conceptions 
regarding specific content areas. Nevertheless, different conceptual change 
views have strived for a description of the underlying factors that give rise to 
the specific conceptions. On the other hand, psychological and cognitive 
science research has strived for a general account of concept learning. This 
research has focused on finding the general properties of how concepts are 
represented and learned.  
Within cognitive science, concepts are assumed to play a role in “higher” 
cognitive capacities such as categorization, reasoning, planning and 
analogical thinking (Machery, 2009). Concepts “carve up the world”, enable 
inferences and organize our knowledge into larger structures (Danks, 2014, 
p. 99). Concepts are bodies of knowledge that are stored in our memory and 
used in processes related to the higher capacities (Machery, 2009, p. 12). 
Despite this general definition, much of the research is centred around 
categorization. While the terms concept and category are sometimes used as 
synonyms, they are often distinguished. Typically, concept refers to the 
mental representations we have about the entities in the world whereas 
category means the groups of entities themselves. 
Many kinds of processes can be viewed as acts of categorization: from 
recognizing objects and people to interpreting a phenomenon as an instance 
of Newton’s second law (Goldstone & Kersten, 2003). Once an entity is 
categorized as something, we can make inferences based on our 
interpretation. In addition to these inductive generalizations, concepts are 
often associated with the generative nature of creative thought: new concepts 
can be formed from existing ones and be readily comprehensible on the basis 
of the parent concepts (Goldstone & Kersten, 2003).  
The psychological and cognitive views on concepts of interest in this 
thesis focus on three types of conceptions of concepts: 1) feature-based 
concepts, 2) concept as embedded in theories, and 3) concepts as relational 
schemes. The first two views have provided the basis for two well-known 
approaches on conceptual change: ontological shift theory (Chi, 2008; 2013) 
and framework theory (Vosniadou, 1994). The third view based on relational 
schemes has not yet led to similar concise, established views on concept 
learning. The systemic view advocated in this thesis is a step in that direction. 
In what follows, each of these three views is briefly discussed from the 
viewpoint of how it is related to concept learning. 
Concept learning and theories of concepts 
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3.2 ONTOLOGICAL SHIFT AND FEATURE-BASED 
CONCEPTS 
Some researchers maintain that many difficulties in learning the concepts of 
physics stem from misconceived ontologies, which are taken as taxonomic 
categories (Chi, 2008; 2013). Students’ ontologies can be characterized as 
knowledge about “what kind of entities there are in the world” (Amin et al, 
2014, p.59). For example, Reiner and her colleagues (2000) note that 
students associate the characteristics of material objects to many physics 
concepts, such as electric current, voltage, heat and force. They suggest that 
this underlies, for example, the above-mentioned prevalent conception of a 
battery as a storage or source of electricity which gets consumed by the 
components (Reiner et al., 2000; see, also, Borges & Gilbert, 1999; 
Koumaras, Kariotoglou & Psillos, 1997; McDermott & Shaffer, 1992).  
One of the most refined and influential views about students’ ontological 
difficulties is the ontological shift theory (Chi & Slotta, 1993; Chi, Slotta, & 
De Leeuw, 1994; Chi, 2008; 2013). The key assumption of the ontological 
shift view is that “entities in the world may be viewed as belonging to 
different ontological categories”, such as “matter”, “processes” or “mental 
states” (Chi & Slotta, 1993, p.251). Consequently, learning is a process of 
organizing the concepts into the correct, normative ontological categories. 
Categorization is thus seen as a powerful learning mechanism, as upon 
categorization concepts can inherit characteristics of the category, which 
allows for novel inferences based on the inherited attributes (Chi & Slotta, 
1993; Chi et al., 1994; Chi, 2008; 2013). An entity belonging to a certain 
category may possess a set of ontological attributes. For example, birds “fly”, 
“lay eggs”, “have feathers”, “have beaks” and so forth. 
Ontological shift is closely related to the concept of differentiation, which 
means drawing a distinction between two close concepts (Smith, Carey, & 
Wiser, 1985). Students often conflate two closely related concepts and fail to 
understand them as different. Common examples include heat and 
temperature (Wiser & Amin, 2001) and electric current and voltage (Lee & 
Law, 2001).  
The ontological shift view is closely linked to theories of concepts that 
assume that concepts are represented by a set of features describing the 
properties of the category members (Goldwater & Schalk, 2016). Moreover, it 
is typically assumed that concepts are organized into hierarchical 
taxonomies. Such theories differ depending on whether they assume that the 
features are about an average (i.e. a prototype) or a typical member (i.e. an 
exemplar) of the category (Machery, 2009). Categorization of entities 
amounts to a similarity comparison between the stimuli and the category 
representation.  
The ontological aspects of concept learning are well documented and are 
deeply rooted in the psychological aspects of concept learning. However, 
while ontological shift as such is acknowledged, some researchers have 
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questioned the centrality of the ontological shift in learning scientific 
concepts (see e.g. diSessa, 1993; Gupta, Hammer, & Redish, 2010; 
Vosniadou, 1994). For example, while Vosniadou (1994) acknowledges the 
importance of ontological shifts, she argues that ontological change is tied to 
multiple changes in the knowledge system. In addition to changes in the 
ontological attributions, it is argued that they also need to go through 
epistemological changes (Vosniadou, 1994).  
3.3 CONCEPTS AS EMBEDDED IN THEORIES: 
FRAMEWORK THEORY 
According to the framework theory view on concept learning, conceptual 
structures consist of epistemic and ontological presuppositions (comprising 
the so-called framework theory) along with specific theories, beliefs and 
mental models. Framework theories constrain the lower level elements so 
that new information gets interpreted in the light of presuppositions (for 
example, new concepts get associated with a certain ontological category, as 
described above). Specific theories are “sets of interrelated propositions or 
beliefs describing the behaviour and properties of physical objects” 
(Vosniadou, 1994, p. 47). For example, “hotness is a transferable property of 
physical objects” could be a part of a student’s specific theory (Vosniadou, 
1994, p.48).  
In the framework theory approach, concepts are assumed to be 
“embedded in theories” (Vosniadou, 1994, p. 46). This conception stems 
from the so-called theory-theory of concepts and concept learning (see e.g. 
Murphy & Medin, 1985). Feature-based theories of concepts can explain 
certain features of our categorization processes but they often dodge the 
question of why only certain features get represented and not some others 
(Machery, 2009). In many situations our judgements go beyond the apparent 
similarity and are instead based on some background or theoretical 
knowledge about the world (Murphy & Medin, 1985). For instance, our 
knowledge about animals in general might affect our categorization and 
similarity judgements. Similarly, it has been argued that our epistemic and 
ontological knowledge affects our knowledge about basics physics concepts 
(Vosniadou, 1994). It should be noted that prototype and exemplar theorists 
could endorse the view of concepts being embedded in theories, as concepts 
can be understood as collections of features embedded in some general 
theory (Machery, 2009). 
3.4 RELATIONAL CONCEPTS 
The framework theory approach goes beyond feature-based representations 
in explaining our categorization judgements and concept learning. It also 
Concept learning and theories of concepts 
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acknowledges that naive conceptions and beliefs cannot be inspected in 
isolation but concept learning involves changes in the interconnected 
elements of the knowledge structure. However, the framework theory puts 
little emphasis on the structure and the relational schemes related to 
individual concepts, which are central in grasping scientific concepts—
especially at the advanced stage of learning (high school and university) (cf. 
Chiou & Anderson, 2010; Koponen & Huttunen, 2013). Similarly, the 
ontological shift view does not address the structure of knowledge but rather 
how students associate certain ontological attributes to the concepts and 
phenomena in question (cf. Chiou & Anderson, 2010; Koponen & Huttunen, 
2013). Moreover, the ontological shift view seems to represent concepts as 
feature lists (Rusanen & Pöyhönen, 2013) while relational knowledge entails 
more advanced cognitive mechanisms (beyond simple feature comparison) to 
be learned and reasoned with (Goldwater & Schalk, 2016).  
Recent cognitive science research acknowledges that many categories are 
characterized by their relational structure. This view stems from another 
version of the theory-theory of concepts according to which, concepts are 
theories (sometimes also called mini-theories)—instead of being embedded 
in theories. That is, concepts store some causal, functional or nomological 
information about the categories they represent (Machery, 2009). For 
instance, birds can fly because they have wings and this explains why these 
features (flying and having wings) occur together (Rehder & Ross, 2001). 
Relational categories consist of systems of relations linking the features 
without specifying them; it is sufficient that the members satisfy the 
relational structure (Rehder & Ross, 2001). In these kinds of categories, 
membership amounts to a more abstract basis for categorization and 
category members may be devoid of any featural similarities (in contrast to 
the above-mentioned views). Up until recently, these kinds of categories have 
been an understudied aspect of concept learning (Goldwater & Gentner, 
2015).  
Relational concepts capture the idea that our understanding of certain 
concepts, such as the “central force system”, is based on the relations the 
concept bears to other concepts or the internal relational structure. For 
example, in the case of the earth and the moon, we may say that the moon is 
related to the earth by virtue of revolving around it. We may also construct a 
physical model of the situation, which can be represented by mathematical 
functions (Gentner, 2005).  
Relational categories can be further divided into role- and schema- 
governed categories (Gentner, 2005; Goldwater, Markman, & Stilwell, 2011; 
Goldwater & Schalk, 2016). In essence, schemas denote whole relational 
systems whereas role-governed categories share a common role within such a 
system. In addition, the constituent items in schema categories (i.e. the 
different roles) can be grouped to form thematic categories (Goldwater et al., 
2011).  
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Feature-based and relational concepts may become connected, as the 
different roles in a particular schema are typically filled with a member of the 
feature-based category (Goldwater et al., 2011). More specifically, relational 
and feature-based categories can be explicitly distinguished by defining 
attributes as predicates that take one argument, and relations as predicates 
taking two or more arguments. LARGE(x) is an attribute while LARGER(x,y) 
is a relation (Gentner, 1983). Furthermore, a distinction can be made 
between first- and higher-order relations: first-order relations relate to 
objects (i.e. members of feature-based categories) whereas second- and 
higher-order relations relate to relations (Gentner, 1983). These distinctions 
originate from analogical learning research, specifically from the structural 
alignment theory, but have been taken up (at least to some extent) by 
educationalists perhaps because they help to conceptualize the nature of the 
knowledge needed to learn science (Goldwater & Schalk, 2016; see e.g. Paatz, 
Ryder, Schwedes, & Scott, 2004; Richland & Simms, 2015).  
Relational knowledge is vital to many of our higher cognitive competences 
(Halford et al., 2010). One crucial property of relational representations is 
that they allow us to go beyond the apparent featural similarity of entities 
being represented. Relational representations are structurally consistent in 
that they support the selection of relations that are conserved across 
instances and thus enable abstraction and, to some degree, independence 
from the similarity of content (Halford et al., 2010). Our inferences or 
categorization judgements are not bound to featural representations but we 
can instead rely on “deep” structural similarities that go beyond superficial 
details. Such structural similarities are important in physics, as physics 
principles and laws are often instantiated in apparently very different 
systems. Goldwater and Schalk (2016) have recently persuasively argued that 
the current research on relational categories offers promising ways for closer 
integration of the different research approaches to science education. 
Scientific knowledge as relational knowledge 
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4 SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AS 
RELATIONAL KNOWLEDGE  
Research on concept learning in science education requires that the goal of 
the learning is explicated; it requires a view of the nature of the scientific 
knowledge. Without an explicated view about the targeted scientific 
knowledge, the goals of science education are not recognized, nor is it 
possible to evaluate if these goals are achieved. As discussed earlier, to assess 
whether a learner has learned a concept amounts to assessing whether he or 
she uses the concept correctly (Rusanen & Pöyhönen, 2013). Research on 
concept learning should thus bridge our understanding between 
psychological aspects of learning and the role of students’ personal 
knowledge in learning and our understanding of the nature of scientific 
knowledge (articles I, IV). Typically, at an advanced level (i.e. in high school 
or university), the learning outcomes are assessed through asking students to 
solve sets of problems, which are intended to be diagnostic of the most 
important contents of the target domain. Three connected domains of 
importance for learning emerge from these considerations: 1) students’ 
personal knowledge, 2) scientific knowledge as target knowledge, and 3) 
learning task designs to achieve the target knowledge.  
Relational knowledge, as well as being fundamental to our higher 
cognitive capacities, is also central in understanding the nature of scientific 
knowledge. Hence, the relational concepts framework offers a natural contact 
point for integrating theories of learning with views about the nature of 
scientific knowledge. In different views on scientific knowledge, relational 
structures are explicitly in focus, most notably in the model-based view of 
science.  
4.1 THE MODEL-BASED VIEW OF SCIENCE AND 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
The best-known model-based view of science in science education and 
science education research is Giere’s view, which sees scientific knowledge 
and scientific theories as clusters or families of related models (Giere, 1988; 
1994). The models can be related to each other via sharing mutual concepts 
and/or relations. For example, Coulomb’s law uses the concepts of force and 
charge while the concept of electric field relates force, charge and Coulomb’s 
law. Models can also be hierarchically related, as some models are derived 
from other, more general ones. In these ways models introduce structure for 
the whole knowledge system (Nousiainen & Koponen, 2010; cf. Balzer, 
Moulines, & Sneed, 1987). Moreover, Giere (1994) suggests that models and 
their relational structure are central in determining the meaning of scientific 
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concepts and how the concepts are applied. Although he does not elaborate 
on the issue, he seems to imply that by applying certain “basic” models (cf. 
Halloun, 1996) in simple situations one learns how the concepts refer and are 
applied as parts of scientific models (Giere, 1994, p. 295). 
Models and their relational structure are typically presented via 
equations, which relate the variables describing the properties of the target 
system (i.e. its intrinsic properties, state or interactions). Giere’s account is 
an example of the so-called semantic view of theories, which identifies 
theories as consisting of classes of structures or classes of models 
(Lorenzano, 2013). These classes are identified on the basis of principles or 
laws—that is, on the basis of their relational structures (Giere, 1988; 1994; 
Lorenzano, 2013). In the more formal version of the semantic view, models 
are cast in set-theoretic terms: theory is viewed as a set of sentences (axioms) 
and the model is a structure in which all the statements are true (Frigg & 
Hartmann, 2017; Suppes, 1962). Frigg and Hartmann (2017; see, also Giere, 
1988) note that especially in physics the idea that models are interpretations 
of more abstract laws is common. For example, Newtonian models are 
typically constructed by applying a general law (such as Newton’s second 
law) to a specific system by combining it with various force function and 
making certain assumptions about the variables relating to the system (Giere, 
1988; Frigg & Hartmann, 2017). 
Certain recent views, while endorsing many of the basic assumptions of 
the semantic view, extend its basic ideas and see models as semi-autonomous 
with respect to theories instead of constitutive of them (Morrison & Morgan, 
1999). These views acknowledge that in scientific practice, models are seldom 
straightforwardly derived from any existing theory. Instead, modelling might 
proceed, for example, via a model template, which is an “abstract conceptual 
idea embedded into a mathematical form or method” (Knuuttila & Loettgers, 
2014, p. 298). This  view also leans on the view of models as relational 
structures, but relaxes and alters the relation of models and theory on the 
one hand, and the relation of models and the target systems (or the world) on 
the other (Frigg & Hartmann, 2017; Knuuttila, 2011). Consequently, rather 
than emphasizing the structure and coherence of expert knowledge, these 
kinds of approaches underline more the practice of modelling and models’ 
role in a knowledge generation. 
4.2 THE MODEL-BASED VIEW OF LEARNING 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
In MBL, models and modelling are seen as essential ingredients of 
constructing, accepting and communicating scientific knowledge. 
Consequently, it has been argued that they should have an important role in 
science education as well (Gilbert & Justi, 2016). Models and modelling-
based pedagogies are often seen as ways to engage students in “authentic” 
Scientific knowledge as relational knowledge 
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scientific practices as well as learn about the nature of models and science 
more broadly (Campbell, Oh, Maughn, Kiriazis, & Zuwallack, 2015). 
One of the main purposes of MBL is enhancing students’ concept 
learning, as models can be viewed as important for constructing and 
communicating the meaning of scientific concepts (Gilbert, 2004). 
Depending on the conception of scientific knowledge (and models) one 
adopts, this might mean for example that theory is interpreted only through 
models, which contextualize the concepts and statements of the theory 
(Bailer-Jones, 2009). One might also view models as constitutive of theories 
(Giere, 1988).  
Regarding concept learning, Amin and others (2014) distinguish two 
broad approaches using models: using ready-made models and model 
construction (i.e. modelling) (Amin et al., 2014; Gilbert & Justi, 2016). Using 
ready-made models refers to using analogies, visualizations, concrete models 
or simulations in order to introduce scientific ideas and concepts to students. 
One of the underlying key ideas in using visualizations or concrete models is 
helping students to ground often abstract scientific concepts and/or models. 
The use of analogies enhances students’ understanding by showing how a 
novel idea or a model is like a familiar one (Duit, 1991). 
In model constructing approaches, students are asked to create and apply 
models of their own via presenting their ideas with various external 
representative means (such as graphs, diagrams or equations). Model 
construction approaches are often embedded in collaborative and inquiry 
learning activities. In inquiry-based approaches, models are constructed in 
order to answer specific questions posed in some phenomenological context. 
There are various conceptualizations of the model construction activities (for 
reviews, see Oh & Oh, 2011; Gilbert & Justi, 2016; Louca & Zacharia, 2012). 
The approaches differ with respect to the amount of scaffolding, and how the 
nature of models (e.g. ontology, the epistemological status) and theories are 
conceptualized. Nevertheless, the approaches share many common traits as 
the process typically starts with a question or a problem and proceeds with 
constructing the model and making systematic observations in order to 
evaluate and subsequently validate the models (Louca & Zacaria, 2012). 
Consequently, students are engaged in phases of creating, applying and 
revising their models, which can result in more meaningful learning and 
better understanding (Oh & Oh, 2012).  
In model construction approaches, the role of models as parts of theories 
is often emphasized, as it is noted that too often naive discovery is applied in 
which questions are often “arbitrary” and hypotheses are “poorly informed 
guesses” (Windschitl, Thompson, & Braaten, 2008, p. 946). This underscores 
the structure and coherence of scientific knowledge (see e.g. Hestenes, 1992). 
Indeed, this aspect is reflected in studies about experts’ and novices’ problem 
representations, as experts exhibit more abstract and coherent knowledge.  
Concept learning is among the most important aims of MBL approaches, 
but still only a few studies have attempted to develop a cognitively justified 
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approach to understanding concept learning within MBL (Louca & Zacharia, 
2012;). This aspect is discussed in articles I and III to some extent. 
Moreover, the use of external representations and how it affects constructing, 
using and learning from models is not particularly well understood (Louca & 
Zacharia, 2012). To this end, Perkins and Grotzer (2005) make an interesting 
contribution, as they discuss how students’ limited repertoire of causal 
modelling styles is an important obstacle in learning. While students are 
initially inclined towards simple linear and/or sequential causality, acquiring 
advanced scientific concepts and models requires familiarity with more 
complex patterns such as constraint-based interaction (Perkins & Grotzer, 
2005). Familiarity with a diverse set of modelling styles and/or complex 
relational patterns is of central importance in making connection across 
domains and noticing relational patterns in novel contexts (Perkins & 
Grotzer, 2005). These aspects are emphasized in the so-called generative 
modelling approach, which emphasizes the relative autonomy of models and 
especially computational methods in constructing and validating the models 
(Koponen & Tala, 2012). 
The argument for the centrality of relational knowledge is in this section 
substantiated through examination of the nature of scientific knowledge. 
Firstly, scientific concepts are typically embedded in models, which contain 
information about the interdependence of the concepts. Acquiring, applying 
and transforming this relational information is at the core of learning 
scientific concepts. Relations between the concepts and how they are 
represented and learned should receive more attention. Unlike everyday 
concepts, which can be learned via contrasting the instances of the concepts, 
scientific concepts are often learned in problem situations where they are 
applied as parts of models which serve as solutions to the problems. 
Scientific concepts are learned in situations where they are used in relation to 
each other. Therefore, models and model-based-view must have a central 
role in the learning of scientific concepts.  
The systemic view of concept learning and conceptual change: Bridging different approaches 
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5 THE SYSTEMIC VIEW OF CONCEPT 
LEARNING AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE: 
BRIDGING DIFFERENT APPROACHES 
When learning scientific concepts, students may encounter numerous 
problems. The target concepts are often complex and abstract, which is a 
challenge for students. Students often acquire conceptions that are false from 
the scientific point of view but are nevertheless robust and hard to change. 
One important question in concept learning concerns the conception of 
concepts, which in turn affects the aspects that are deemed central in 
learning scientific concepts. For example, it seems that the structure of 
students’ concepts and how these structures change has received little 
attention. Nevertheless, examination of the nature of scientific knowledge 
and recent cognitive scientific research on concept learning implies that the 
structural aspects of models and concepts are central. Similarly, recent 
research in cognitive science research has suggested that relational 
representations are fundamental to our cognitive capacities and central to 
our understanding.  
5.1 THE SYSTEMIC VIEW 
In this thesis, students’ concept learning is analysed from a viewpoint based 
on recent research on relational concepts and relational representations. A 
viewpoint that connects concept learning and a model-based view can be 
based on the relational structure of concepts and how the concepts are 
embedded in a system of relations. This is a key notion of the systemic view, 
which sees knowledge as a complex relational system.  
The thesis shows how the systemic view is contextualized in the case of 
learning concepts of DC circuits (articles I, II and IV), how it connects to a 
model-based view of science education (articles I and III), and how the 
systemic view yields computational modelling which describes concept 
learning (articles IV and V). In the following, I provide a summary of how 
the systemic view bridges these different areas.  
The systemic view, as discussed in detail in article IV, and utilized in 
articles I and II, considers the different relations between concepts as well as 
the attributes students associate with the concepts. Attributes and 
attributions can be constitutive of some simple beliefs associated with the 
concepts as well as provide information about the perceived ontologies of 
concepts. The attributes in the systemic view are understood similarly in the 
feature-based theories of concepts as well as in the ontological shift or 
framework theories (Slotta, Chi, & Joram, 1995; Wiser & Amin, 2001). 
Consequently, the initial differentiation of closely related concepts can be 
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conceptualized in terms of the attributes associated with the concepts; 
concepts can be said to be differentiated if they are associated with different 
sets of attributes as discussed in detail in articles I and IV. However, the 
study reported in article I suggests that only when concepts are used in law-
like relations are they properly understood as different. These relations are 
typically manifested in scientific models, whose role in concept learning is 
intertwined with this role as argued in article III (see also, article I). 
The close connection between the relational knowledge and model-based-
approach in science teaching is not fully developed in the systemic view as 
presented in article IV but the issue is discussed in articles I and III. It 
suggests that the relevant aspects of models and concepts embedded in them 
are the types of relations as well as the kinds of relational patterns associated 
with the concepts. It is furthermore discussed how these are related to the 
construction of models, and how such a picture provides a fresh viewpoint on 
model-based learning in science education. 
The systemic view and conception of concepts as relational schemes yields 
computational modelling of concept learning. Articles IV and V present two 
proof-of-concept types of computational models, which incorporate central 
ideas of the systemic view. The computational models open up the possibility 
of exploring and proposing grounded hypotheses about the dependence 
between student’s initial, personal knowledge, structure of target knowledge 
(scientific knowledge) as well as task design and structure. The interplay 
between these three diverse fields is not easily approached empirically, but 
computational studies may help to gain insight into those connection points 
which are of most importance and might yield empirical approaches. 
5.2 THE DIRECTED GRAPH MODEL 
In discussing concept learning, articles I, II, IV and V utilize a graphical 
representation of concepts, thus capturing the nature of concepts as 
relational structures. In articles I and II, exploratory, descriptive empirical 
studies were conducted in the context of DC circuits. In article I, students’ 
conceptions about DC circuits and related concepts as well as the changes in 
the explanation models students generated were examined by using the 
directed graph model (DGM), introduced in detail in article IV. The DGM is 
used in this thesis to represent the relational aspects of the concepts as well 
as the dynamics of the learning process. The DGM was developed during this 
thesis to facilitate visual representation of the complex structure of advanced 
concepts. 
The DGM represents students’ conceptions and explanation models as 
collections of different conceptual elements: models, attributes, concepts and 
different relational patterns. An example of a DGM (discussed in detail in 
article I) appears in Figure 2. In article II, the different relational patterns 
identified in article I were simplified further and used to describe features of 
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students’ conception about DC circuits. These idealized relational patterns 
appear in Figure 3.  
In article I, close attention was paid to so-called constraints, which were 
conceptualized as limitations in the use of attributes. In the context of DC 
circuits, an important set of constraints is derived from circuits’ geometry. 
Here, the attribute “divides” can be used with the constraint “in parallel” to 
denote the conception that the electric current divides in junctions where two 
components are connected in parallel. Furthermore, it was noted that 
relations between concepts are not always causal but can be viewed as 
constraining laws. For example, Ohm’s law typically has a causal reading 
(voltage causes current) and Kirchhoff’s laws I and II are essentially 
constraining conservation laws. 
 
Figure 2 Template of DGM graph representing students’ knowledge (article I). An example 
representing the typical conception of the consumption of current in a circuit 
appears in black lines. Possible (but not active) connections between conceptual 
elements appear in grey. Attributes (a1,…,a9), relations (r1, r2, r3), constraints (c1, 
c2, c3) and models (M1,…,M8) are described in article I in more detail. The 
uppermost row denotes the possible predictions/observations required by the task 
design (i.e. task structure). Originally published in article I. 
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Figure 3 Diagrams of generic relational patterns appearing in students’ explanations. 
Originally published in article II. 
Constraints and different relational patterns (appearing in Figure 3) are 
relational representations. From the relational concepts framework they can 
be interpreted as relational representations of a different order (Gentner, 
1983; Paatz et al., 2004). Kirchhoff’s laws can be interpreted as first-order 
relations while Ohm’s law can be seen as a higher-order relation relating to 
three concepts (see r3 in Figure 3), voltage, electric current and resistance, 
which are themselves relational.  
5.3 EMPIRICAL STUDIES: DC CIRCUITS 
The studies reported in articles I and II are descriptive exploratory empirical 
studies about students’ concepts related to DC circuits. Here, a brief 
description of the methods and subsequent analysis of the data is presented. 
A more thorough description can be found in articles I and II. In both 
studies, students worked with DC circuit tasks in which one has to predict 
and explain the relative brightness of bulbs connected to different basic 
circuits. An example of the circuit used in both studies appears in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4 An example of circuits studied in articles I and II. Originally published in article I.  
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5.3.1 METHOD 
In article I, 31 university students worked in groups of 2 or 3 with tutorial-
type tasks where one must first predict and explain the order of brightness of 
bulbs and then construct the actual circuits to test the predictions. First, 
students were asked to think about their predictions on their own for a few 
minutes. They were then asked to explain and discuss their prediction with 
others. Finally, students were asked to explain their observations. In article 
II, 11 university students worked alone with pen and paper versions of 
similar tasks. In both studies, the majority of participants were university 
students minoring in physics who attended the intermediate courses 
intended for pre-service physics teachers.  
In the group sessions, an interviewer was present at all times. The 
interviewers mainly asked only clarifying questions during the tutorial-type 
tasks and avoided “feeding” any terms and/or concepts to the students. The 
group sessions can be conceived as an unstructured or informal 
conversational interview, as there were no predetermined questions and the 
session was guided only by the task at hand. The interviews were videotaped 
and transcribed verbatim. The interviews lasted on average 23 minutes 
(ranging from 10 to 36 minutes).    
The transcripts as well as students answers to the pen and paper versions 
of the tasks were analysed by means of content analysis (cf. Chi, 1997; Elo & 
Kyngäs, 2008; Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). As the purpose was to 
identify the conceptual elements students used as well as the explanation 
models they generated, the analysis consisted of two coding cycles targeting 
patterns at different levels (Miles, Huberman & Saldaña, 2014). The first 
cycle consisted of condensing the essential ideas of students’ verbal 
expressions and segmenting the condensed expressions. This was followed by 
the coding of the segments (i.e. identifying the names of the concepts used as 
well as the attributes and relations). The second coding cycle was carried out 
to merge the categories (attributes and relations) into meaningful patterns 
(i.e. explanation models). In article II, the analysis of the written answers 
consisted of identifying the relational patterns students used in explaining 
the relative brightness of the bulbs.  
In article I, the different elements were combined into a graph (see 
Figures 2 and 5) to present how different elements were connected together 
in students’ explanations. Two graphs were drawn for each student: one for 
the prediction phase and one for the explanation phase.  
5.3.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In both of the studies presented in articles I and II, students made false 
predictions regarding the different degrees of the bulbs’ brightness. They 
typically could provide only partial explanations for their observations. 
Students held false beliefs such as the electric current gets used up or 
consumed in the circuit, which were reflected in their predictions that one of 
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the bulbs connected in the series would be brighter than the other—a belief 
that is prevalent in previous studies about the topic (Lee & Law, 2001; 
McDermott & Shaffer, 1992). The belief that the battery acts as a source of 
constant current was found to be very common too (see also, McDermott & 
Shaffer, 1992). 
However, the main interest of the analysis was to identify students’ 
explanation models and their changes at a detailed level. The different 
models were categorized according to the concepts and relations 
incorporated in them. Students were also found to use a range of explanation 
models to account for the differences in brightness. The explanation models 
identified in article I appear in Table I. Four examples of students’ 
conceptions represented via DGM appear in Figure 5. The interlinkages of 
different conceptual elements differ across students, and variations in the 
interlinkages are substantial. Each of the examples shown in Figure 5 
represents a very different “conception” and a simple verbal description of 
such conceptions would be difficult.   
As indicated in previous studies about the topic (see e.g. Reiner et al., 
2000), students favoured rather simple models involving only one or two 
concepts. Typically, students generated explanations based on the electric 
current. As discussed by Reiner et al. (2000), students’ conceptions of 
voltage may not be as clearly defined as their conceptions of a current, as the 
current lends itself more easily to concrete, materialistic associations. As a 
consequence, students might more readily use current-based explanations 
when prompted. The simplest explanations were mere rules of thumb— such 
as “bulbs connected in parallel are equally bright”—rather than actual 
explanations. As such these simple explanations are not generalizable to 
other contexts. However, as mentioned above, these descriptive statements 
might act as heuristics for students guiding the construction of more 
sophisticated explanations.  
The different beliefs (such as “the current degrades” or “is consumed in 
the circuit”) related to the concepts were represented as different 
constellations of attributes. This is related to the way in which the attributes 
are discussed in feature-based theories of concepts. Moreover, it is 
comparable to the way in which concepts’ ontologies are discussed as 
different attributes connected to the concepts (see e.g. Slotta at al. 1995; 
Wiser & Amin, 2001). However, the studies presented in articles I and II 
distinguish between feature-like attributes and relational features unlike 
most studies discussing students’ ontologies related to DC circuits (see e.g. 
Slotta et al., 1995). 
The ontological shift is not discussed in this thesis in detail, but the 
results imply that certain beliefs held by the students might stem from simple 
material associations as discussed in Reiner et al. (2000). Nevertheless, it 
seems that at the university level, the relational schemes associated with the 
concepts cause students difficulties and learning at this stage can be 
attributed to the students’ ability to apply and modify relational knowledge. 
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The results of this thesis align with Koponen and Huttunen (2013), who 
claim that law-like knowledge (i.e. causal schemes) has an important role in 
driving the changes in the ontological attribution of concepts. 
While many students’ explanations were rather simple, some of them 
could modify their initial predictions after observing the actual circuits. 
Comparing the DGMs from the prediction and explanation phases enabled 
analysing the changes in students’ explanation models. This revealed three 
distinct processes that seem central to concept learning: model switch, model 
elaboration and model refinement. The different processes appear in Figure 
6. Model switch involves switching from one explanation model (used in the 
predicting the brightness) to another which does not share features with the 
initial model. Rather than simply switching the model, model elaboration 
includes adding elements to the initial model. For example, a student might 
have initially used a current-based explanation and elaborated it to include 
resistance in order to account for the observations. Model refinement means 
merging many models into one. 
The change processes which appear in Figure 6 are comparable to the way 
in which certain aspects of acquiring relational knowledge is discussed within 
cognitive science (see e.g. Halford, Wilson & Phillips, 2010; Dixon & Kelley, 
2007; Corral & Jones, 2014). Theory revision amounts to revising a 
hypothesized relational structure if it fails to account for the situation at hand 
(Dixon & Kelley, 2007). Corral and Jones (2014) argue that (at least) two 
sub-processes, schema refinement and schema elaboration contribute to the 
revision of the relational structure. Comparably to the discussion in article I, 
elaboration means adding relations to the existing structure. Refinement 
amounts to stripping away unessential details corresponding to an analogical 
learning scenario, which results in abstracting the schema so that it contains 


















Table 1. The descriptions of the explanation models that the students used in the 
interviews. Originally published in article I. 
Model Description Related concept(s) Relations 
M1 Simple 
models 
These models are based on a 
simple rule of thumb, such as: 
“When the bulbs are in a series, they 




The only concept used in this model 
is the current: a current flows into a 




A current flowing in a circuit makes 
the bulbs light up, and the current 
depends on either the resistance of 
the circuit or the voltage between 
the ends of the battery or 
component. 
I, R or U r1 
M4 Ohmian 
model 
A current flowing in a circuit makes 
the bulbs light up. The current 
depends on the resistance of the 
circuit and the voltage between the 
ends of the battery or component. 
I, R, U r2 
M5 Pre-electric 
power model 
a) The brightness of the bulb 
depends on the current running 
through it and the voltage between 
its ends. 
b) The brightness of the bulb 
depends on the current running 
through it and the resistance of the 
bulb.  
I, R or U r3 
M6 Resistance-
based model  
This model uses only resistance. 
The brightness of the bulbs is 
determined by the resistance of the 





The brightness of the bulb depends 
on the voltage between its ends. 
The voltage depends on the 
resistance of the bulb. 
U, R r1 
M8 Voltage-
based model 
This model uses only voltage. The 
brightness of the bulb depends on 
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Figure 5 Examples of two students’ conceptions represented via DGMs. The DGMs on the 
left are from the prediction stage, the DGMs on the right are from the explanation 
stage. Adapted from article I. 
 
Figure 6 Changes in students’ explanation models. The concepts (e.g. electric current, 
voltage and resistance) are denoted by x, y and z, while a1,..., b1,... and c1,… 
denote the attributes associated with the concepts. Originally published in article I. 
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5.4 CONCEPT LEARNING RELATED TO MODEL-BASED 
LEARNING 
Relational schemes, according to the view developed in this thesis, are closely 
related to models and modelling. According to the model-based view on 
science education, models and modelling are key structures for learning 
scientific concepts and facilitating conceptual change. Despite concept 
learning being one of the most important aims of MBL, only a few studies 
have attempted to construct a cognitively justified basis for concept learning 
within MBL.  
In the theoretical article III, MBL was examined from the viewpoint of 
the relational concepts framework. It was argued that models can be 
conceptualized as relational categories, which are categories whose 
membership is determined by a common relational structure. A “central 
force system” can then be thought of as a category consisting of the systems 
that satisfy the relevant relations. On the other hand, as models can become 
objects of study in their own right, the category can also be thought to consist 
of the models (instead of the systems) that describe a central force system. By 
viewing models as relational categories, I sought to illuminate the roles of 
models and modelling in learning scientific concepts and the related 
cognitive aspects in the context of MBL. 
As already discussed in chapter 4, two broad approaches can be 
distinguished within MBL: using ready-made models and model constructing 
(Amin et al., 2014). In article III, two different dispositions towards model 
construction are pointed out: constructive and generative modelling. In 
constructive modelling approaches, models are parts of larger, more 
comprehensive frameworks (i.e. theories) (see e.g. Hestenes, 1992). 
Generative modelling, on the other hand, assumes a more autonomous role 
for models, where models are typically not straightforwardly derived from 
any existing theory (see e.g. Koponen & Tala, 2014). In contrast, modelling 
can draw from multiple recourses and include purely phenomenological 
elements. These perspectives (constructive and generative modelling) come 
close to semantic and artefactual views of modelling, respectively (see, Giere, 
1988; Knuuttila, 2011; Lorenzano, 2013).  
Conceptualizing models as relational categories underscores the 
importance of relational knowledge in learning the concepts in the context of 
MBL. Firstly, constructing and applying models requires grasping the 
relational structure embedded in specific models. Secondly, acquiring the 
interconnected and coherent knowledge structure, which is emphasized in 
constructive modelling approaches, entails learning the relations between the 
models. Making connections across different hierarchies of models (see e.g. 
Halloun, 1996; Hestenes, 1992) also requires relational knowledge, as 
abstraction is enabled by relational representations (Halford et al., 2010). 
Teaching should support the learning of such knowledge.  
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The ability to construct and identify relational schemes in novel situations 
is central in generative modelling approaches where models are seen as semi-
autonomous (see e.g. Koponen & Tala, 2014; Lehrer & Schauble, 2015). This 
also includes transferring schemes from one context and/or domain to 
another, as well as using multiple different external representations. From 
the viewpoint of relational categories, general relational knowledge is vital in 
this kind of modelling. Also, generative modelling requires a developed 
repertoire of “modelling styles”–for example, expertise in modelling with 
constraint equations. Consequently, the choice of external representations 
(or modelling tools) is also of central importance because it affects what is or 
can be learned from the model. For instance, mathematics can assist in 
students’ conceptual development (Amin et al., 2014; Lehrer, Schauble, 
Strom, & Pligge, 2001; Lehrer & Schauble, 2015) and therefore it should not 
be treated as mere computation.  
Research in science education as well as cognitive science has examined 
how students learn general relational schemes and specific modelling styles. 
Goldwater and Gentner (2015) have argued that familiarity to particular 
causal systems as well as comparing relational structures across contexts is 
required in order to learn general causal schemes. Likewise, Perkins and 
Grotzer (2005) explicated particular causal models through discussion and 
by applying them to several contexts. They concluded that explication and 
comparison of models helped students to learn the concepts better.  
The ideas and views developed in article III derive from many different 
sources and an attempt is made to provide a synthesis of these different 
views based on the idea of the centrality of relational schemes in acquiring 
advanced scientific knowledge. Article III includes theoretical underpinnings 
of the work reported in this thesis, but at present many ideas put forward 
there are tentative and have not yet led to practical implementations in 
science education or science teacher education. However, such implications 
and applications are envisioned and under development. 
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6 COMPUTATIONAL MODELLING OF 
CONCEPT LEARNING  
Articles IV and V present computational modelling and simulations of the 
concept learning process. Article IV reports work based on an earlier study 
by Koponen and Huttunen (2013) and utilizes a DGM developed therein as 
the template for the simulations. Putting the mathematics of the simulations 
aside (reported in detail in articles IV and V but not of central interest here), 
article IV introduces a connectionist-type model, while in V a simplified, 
complex systems-type model is introduced.  
6.1 CONNECTIONIST COMPUTATIONAL MODEL 
In the model presented in article IV, the basic idea is that a knowledge 
system is a directed graph consisting of connected nodes which have 
dynamically evolving strengths. The nodes correspond to the different 
conceptual elements, and the different activation patterns correspond to 
different learning outcomes. The learning outcomes can be monitored via the 
quantities theoricity and separability, which operationalize the notions of 
the theory content of the concept and its degree of differentiation, 
respectively (see the Appendix in article IV for details and precise 
definitions).  
6.1.1 THE SIMULATION  
In the DGM presented in article IV, the concepts consist of sets of attributes 
(dubbed C constructs) as in the feature-based theories of concepts (see 
chapter 3.2). Such C constructs can become connected via relational schemes 
(called D constructs), which not only link the C constructs but also constrain 
what attribute sets can be applied. In the context of the DC circuit the 
relevant schemes are Kirchhoff’s laws and Ohm’s law. In addition, C and D 
constructs can be parts of models (M constructs), which serve as vehicles for 
generating explanations (comparably to the explanation models explained in 
article I, see section 5.2). C, D, and M constructs serve as nodes in the graphs 
and are connected via directed links. Each of the nodes has a dynamically 
evolving strength, which determines the node’s effect (either inhibiting or 
strengthening) on the nodes to which it is connected.  
The evolution of the concept system (i.e. updating node strengths) is 
driven by comparing the models to evidence, which corresponds to the 
observations of different DC circuits. The models’ utility (i.e. the ratio of their 
complexity and explanatory power) determines which model will be favoured 
and, thus, how the strengths of the other conceptual elements will evolve. In 
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simple situations, simple models will provide adequate explanations and, 
hence, their utility will be high whereas complex models will have low utility. 
In contrast, in more complex situations, more complex models will be 
favoured, as the simple models cannot explain the evidence. The models’ 
utility and hence the evolution of the concept system is also affected by 
learner dependent parameters, namely the ability to use theoretical 
knowledge and attentiveness to the evidence. Cognitive utility has previously 
been proposed as a key variable underlying reasoning and decision-making 
processes in general (Ohlsson, 2009; 2013). Ohlsson (2013) describes utility 
as usefulness of a given knowledge structure in a certain context. 
In the computational model, concept differentiation and ontological 
change are modelled as changes in the concepts’ links to the attributes. 
Differentiation is measured as the separability of the C constructs, which is a 
measure of the dissimilarity of the sets of attributes connected to the 
concepts. Another measure of the state of the system (i.e. the learning 
outcome) is the theoricity of the concept, which is operationalized as the 
connectedness of the models and the C constructs (see the Appendix in 
article IV for details). 
6.1.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The main results illuminate the context-dependent dynamics of learning. The 
learning trajectories resulting from the simulation resemble the learning 
trajectories to the extent that they can be inferred from empirical data. 
Examples of the simulated learning trajectories corresponding to different 
initial conditions (modelling different initial states of students’ knowledge) 
are given in Figure 7.  
In the computational model, the utility of students’ explanatory models 
drives the evolution of the concept system, and complete learning of the most 
complex models appears only in sufficiently rich contexts (i.e. when the 
models are compared to the most complex circuits)(cf. Ohlsson, 2013). This 
reflects how during learning certain features, or “misconceptions”, appear 
robust but are fundamentally context dependent.  
In the computational model, ontological changes (i.e. changes in the 
attribute sets connected to the C constructs) and differentiation are driven by 
the successful application of models. This in turn strengthens certain 
relational schemes that constrain which attributes are used. So instead of 
ontological change driving concept learning, the present model implies that it 
is a consequence more of adopting theoretical structures (i.e. relational 
schemes). Hence, the models’ implications of top-down learning, leaning on 
relational schemes known to a learner at least partially, stand in contrast to 
views where learning happens in a more bottom-up fashion (e.g. through 
changes at the ontological level). According to the systemic view, and how the 
computational model embodies its main assumptions, ontological shift as a 
driving mechanism for advanced learning is implausible. Rather, ontological 
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Figure 7 The theoricity T and separability S of concepts C1 (bullets) and C2 (boxes) in the 
case of six different learning paths with given parameters K and D’ that control the 
strength of the theoretical guidance. Parameter K is related to the potential of an 
individual student to make use theoretical knowledge in constructing explanatory 
models. Parameter D’ controls how strongly theoretical knowledge will guide the 
learning process. The upper row shows cases where K ≥ 0.8 is always relatively 
high but D’ varies from 1.0 to 0.4. In the lower row, K also varies from a high value 
of 0.8 to a lower value of 0.5. The initial values of the model strengths and strengths 
of the observations are different in the cases shown in the left, middle and right 
columns (corresponding model strengths are shown in Figure 6). Left column: Initial 
values of model strengths favour models M1 and M2’ with strengths of 0.5, while 
other models have a weaker but equal strength of 0.25. The observations of events 
I-III (corresponding to different DC circuits, for details see article IV) are strong (link 
strengths have a value of 1). Middle column: model strengths as in the left column, 
but M3, M3’ and M4 are reduced to 0.15, observations I-II are strong (1), but III is 
only moderately strong (0.75). Right column: otherwise similar to the middle 
column, but the observations in case III are weak (0.10). The training sequence 
from I to III (end points of each sequence are marked in the figure), with three 
repetitions for each event are shown by black dots. The training sequence testing 
the permanence of learning from I to III, then back from III to I, and one random 
sequence are shown by grey dots. Letters A-D indicate the values of T and S 
corresponding to typical DGMs (see article IV), which depict students’ conceptions 
(two letters for each are located in the pairs of the lowest estimated and highest 
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6.2 COMPLEX SYSTEMS MODEL 
6.2.1 THE SIMULATION  
The DGM represents the concept system as directed graphs and as connected 
groups of nodes with evolving strengths, which correspond to the conceptual 
states. The corresponding computational model is necessarily a connectionist 
model, which is difficult to handle. One disadvantage of such a model is that 
a parametric description of how the input of the model is connected to the 
output cannot be produced. Despite all its advantages the connectionist 
model remains a kind of “black box” model. To gain more transparent insight 
into how robust learning outcomes might be related to initial states of 
learning and task structures, a different type of model was developed in the 
study reported in article V. It starts from a simplified DGM, but transforms 
the dependencies contained in it to a complex system model, in which the 
DGM is replaced by an abstract continuum representation of the target 
knowledge. The continuum model is a kind of epistemic landscape (cf. 
Weisberg & Muldoon 2009), and learning is described as foraging for the 
best model in that landscape. The resulting model is a probabilistic learning 
model (PLM), where the learning progression is guided by the epistemic 
landscape.  
The PLM explores the possibility of modelling concept learning in a 
context which resembles learning a simple theory. The “theory” consists of 
three concepts and three relational schemes arranged into a three-tiered 
model space. The learning process in PLM is conceptualized as the foraging 
of the epistemic landscape, in which a model is selected based on its utility as 
the evidence unfolds. As in the DGM, utility is a trade-off measure between 
the model’s complexity and its explanatory power. 
The components of the epistemic landscape considered here are 
proficiency κ, evidence ε, and utility u. Proficiency describes the learner’s 
proficiency in using the model to give an explanation. Evidence refers to the 
cases (e.g. different circuits) students need to explain although it is taken as a 
continuous parameter in the model. The utilities of the different models are 
given as probability distributions, which take proficiency and evidence as 
parameters. The epistemic landscape thus corresponds to an abstract 
representation of the likelihood of adopting certain explanation model given 
the evidence and proficiency. An example of a simplified epistemic landscape 
is shown in Figure 8. The topography of the landscape corresponds to the 
utilities while the other coordinates correspond to evidence and proficiency. 
Foraging of the epistemic landscape consists of utility-based selection of 
explanatory models. In practice, κ is given an initial value and ε is increased 
by 0.01 (which corresponds to unfolding evidence). Then it is decided 
whether: 1) a model switch happens 2) κ is changed or remains unchanged, 
and 3) whether the selected model explains the given model or not. For each 
of the steps 1)-3) each outcome is assigned a discrete probability. 
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Figure 8 The epistemic landscape illustrating the utilities of five different explanation models 
as functions of ε and κ. The diagram on the left shows the landscape and the 
diagram on the right is its representation as a contour plot. 
 
Figure 9 The densities Ψ"(𝜀, 𝜅) of selected explanatory models, m1–m5 for different memory 
parameters (see article V) µ = 0.02, 0.03 and 0.05. The upper panel shows results 
for the initial mid-cohort (0.45< κ <0.55) and the lower panel for the low-cohort 
(0.30< κ <0.40).   
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6.2.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The simulations of PLM are carried out as event-based stochastic simulations 
(for details, see article V). The outcome of the simulations is a number 
density distributions Yk of different explanatory models corresponding to the 
different stages of learning during the learning task. The interesting 
behaviour of the simulation is the formation of attractor-type areas to which 
the learning paths accumulate—that is, regions where the number density of 
a certain model peaks. Some of such attractor states are shown in Figure 9.  
The attractor-type states can be interpreted as robust learning outcomes. 
The formation of such states can be partly attributed to the confidence and 
memory parameters and their interplay with the learning design. Such 
learning outcomes are traditionally the targets of studies regarding students’ 
conceptions, but we suggested that they can arise through the interplay 
between learning dynamic and task characteristics. So instead of thinking 
that students enter the learning situation with robust pre-existing 
misconceptions (or develop them during the course of learning), we could 
think of them as epiphenomena of the learning dynamics. 
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7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis, it is advocated that research on concept learning benefits from 
linking views about the cognition of learning with views about the nature of 
the targeted scientific knowledge. On one hand, as learning is a psychological 
phenomenon involving the transformation of one’s cognitive representations, 
we need to lean on theories which concern cognitive conceptual 
representation. On the other hand, in order to assess learning, we need to 
compare learners’ inferences to the benchmark inferences provided by 
accepted scientific knowledge. While these two perspectives offer a 
complementary picture of the learning process, it is underscored that they 
are distinct because scientific knowledge cannot be conceived as the 
representation of any one individual.  
Traditional approaches about concept learning and conceptual change put 
little emphasis on the level of individual concepts. In this thesis, it is 
suggested that at the advanced level of learning the relational aspects of 
concepts are central. This assumption is supported by the notion that 
cognitive science research has shown that relational representations are 
central to our higher cognitive competences in general. This is relevant for 
concept learning in science, as it implies that learning advanced concepts is 
markedly cognitively different than learning e.g. simple concepts.  
The conviction of the centrality of relational concepts in learning science 
stems partly from analyses of the nature of scientific knowledge, which have 
pointed out the centrality of different types of relational structures in 
scientific knowledge. For example, according to the so-called semantic view, 
scientific knowledge consists of classes of structures, which are identified 
based on laws or principles. Relational knowledge thus also provides the 
basis for reinterpretations of model-based learning (MBL) and provides 
insight why it is so successful. First, the use of analogies in constructing 
models hinges on mapping the relevant relations between the source and the 
target. Second, analogical mapping based on relational knowledge enhances 
learning abstract, general relational schemes. Third, general relational 
schemes are important in applying and constructing models in novel 
situations.  
The empirical results presented in this thesis reveal that in the context of 
DC circuits, students at the university level still rely on rather 
unsophisticated explanation models. In general, they can differentiate the 
concepts at the attribute level but lack the relevant relations. This suggests 
that (qualitative) differentiation precedes the learning of relations and 
learning in the advanced setting can be attributed to greater proficiency in 
using relational knowledge. Some students taking part in the studies could 
modify their explanations. Analysis of the changes identified three types of 
changes: model switch, model refinement and model elaboration.  
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The results imply that students’ ability to apply and modify relational 
knowledge is vital to the construction of correct explanation models. 
Moreover, as relational knowledge is central to human cognition on the one 
hand, and to physics knowledge on the other, it has a key role in learning and 
understanding physics. Seen this way, the central learning processes are 
those which relate to revision of the relational structure. This view differs 
from previous research suggesting simple categorization processes as the 
main mechanisms behind concept learning (cf. Chi, 2008; 2013; Vosniadou, 
1994) and provides a fresh approach on old, still unresolved problems of 
concept learning and conceptual change. 
In this thesis, simulations were also carried to test certain hypotheses and 
to underscore the role of relational knowledge in guiding concept learning. 
The results of simulations imply that a major driving force behind concept 
learning is competition between different explanation models and the utility 
of the models. Model competition is driven partly by the model’s explanatory 
power and its complexity but also the learner’s’ proficiency in adopting the 
model. Importantly, the simulation models imply that robust learning 
outcomes are the outgrowths of the learning task design and certain 
parameters describing the learner stemming from the psychology of learning. 
This is in contrast with traditional approaches where the learners are 
assumed to enter the learning situation with robust and well-defined 
preconceptions instead of preconceptions which emerge from context-
dependent dynamics and the interaction between the learner and the task at 
hand.  
The literature on concept learning from science education research is here 
linked with recent cognitive science research about relational concepts as 
well as with views about the nature and structure of scientific knowledge. The 
proposed conceptualizations put relational knowledge at the core of learning 
scientific concepts, where relations are seen as fundamental in constructing 
the understanding and meaning of concepts. This systemic view of concept 
learning offers a cognitively well-justified framework for analysing concept 
learning and its mechanisms. The centrality of relational schemes and 
structures in both areas—cognition and science—have fundamental 
implications and repercussions for science education research and practice 
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